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Abstract
We consider multi-agent systems interacting over directed network topologies where a subset of agents is adversary/faulty
and where the non-faulty agents have the goal of reaching consensus, while fulfilling a differential privacy requirement on
their initial conditions. To address this problem, we develop an update law for the non-faulty agents. Specifically, we propose
a modification of the so-called Mean-Subsequence-Reduced (MSR) algorithm, the Differentially Private MSR (DP-MSR)
algorithm, and characterize three important properties of the algorithm: correctness, accuracy and differential privacy. We
show that if the network topology is (2f+1)-robust, then the algorithm allows the non-faulty agents to reach consensus despite
the presence of up to f faulty agents and we characterize the accuracy of the algorithm. Furthermore, we also show in two
important cases that our distributed algorithm can be tuned to guarantees differential privacy of the initial conditions and
the differential privacy requirement is related to the maximum network degree. The results are illustrated via simulations.
Key words: Multi-agent systems, Resilient consensus, Differential privacy, Networked control systems
1 Introduction
The introduction of low-cost, high performance and
connected devices lead, over the last few years, to a
paradigm shift on how engineering systems are designed
(di Bernardo et al., 2016; Albert et al., 2000; Fiore
et al., 2017). The philosophy design for those systems is
indeed transitioning from a centralized to a distributed
paradigm and, in this context, two fundamental chal-
lenges are: (i) the fact that agents/nodes might be
subject of failures or attacks; and (ii) privacy preserva-
tion of individual information. Power grids (Do¨rfler and
Bullo, 2014) and smart transportation systems (Griggs
et al., 2018) are examples of systems where control
and coordination strategies cannot neglect these funda-
mental requirements of privacy preservation and fault
tolerance. Motivated by this, we present an algorithm
that: (i) allows a multi-agent system to reach consensus
despite a subset of agents being faulty; and (ii) guaran-
tees differential privacy of the initial conditions of the
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non-faulty agents. We now briefly review some related
works on Differential Privacy and Resilient Consensus.
Differential Privacy. The notion of differential privacy
was originally introduced in (Dwork et al., 2006a,b) in
relation to the design of privacy preserving mechanisms
of databases. From the intuitive viewpoint, a database is
differentially private if the removal or addition of a single
database entry does not substantially affect the outcome
of any analysis on the database data. This privacy defini-
tion is also particularly well-suited for networked multi-
agent systems, where communication channels might not
be fully secure and where agents might not trust each
other. In the context of multi-agent systems, protecting
initial information of each agent often implies protecting
the current state of the network. This is the case, for ex-
ample, of platoon systems, see e.g. (Monteil and Russo,
2017), where each vehicle in the platoon wishes to keep
private its initial position. Based on such observations,
(Huang et al., 2012) considered the problem of designing
a distributed consensus algorithm for multi-agent sys-
tems (evolving over an undirected graph topology) guar-
anteeing differential privacy of the initial conditions of
the agents. In particular, the paper shows that if each
agent adds some decaying Laplacian noise to its averag-
ing dynamics, then mean square convergence to a ran-
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dom consensus value, whose expected value depends on
the undirected network topology, can be proved and dif-
ferential privacy of the initial conditions can be guaran-
teed. More recently, (Nozari et al., 2017) proposed an al-
gorithm which guarantees both almost sure convergence
to an unbiased estimate of the average of agents’ initial
conditions and differential privacy of their values, al-
lowing individual agents, interacting over an undirected
graph, to independently choose their level of privacy. The
concept of differential privacy has been also successfully
used in distributed estimation (Le Ny and Pappas, 2014)
and optimization (Han et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2015;
Nozari et al., 2018), while other notions of privacy, see
(Mo and Murray, 2017) and references therein for fur-
ther details, have been also investigated for consensus.
Resilient Consensus. Resilient consensus has received
much research attention and we refer the reader to
(Tseng and Vaidya, 2016) and (LeBlanc et al., 2013) for
a detailed literature review. The original formulation
of the problem can be traced back to (Lamport et al.,
1982; Dolev, 1982). In such works, the authors intro-
duced the Approximate Byzantine Consensus problem
where the agents have to agree on some legit value de-
spite the fact that at most f agents may be adversary
(also termed faulty or Byzantine). The networks consid-
ered in the paper were complete and, for such networks,
the Mean-Subsequence-Reduced (MSR) algorithm was
proposed, see also (Kieckhafer and Azadmanesh, 1994).
Tight conditions for approximate consensus using the
MSR algorithm in directed networks with f Byzantine
agents were derived in (Vaidya et al., 2012), while, in
(LeBlanc et al., 2013; Zhang and Sundaram, 2012) a
modification of the MSR algorithm has been proposed,
the Weighted-MSR. The conditions derived therein were
stated in terms of the so-called r-robustness property
that characterizes the local redundancy of informa-
tion flow (Zhang et al., 2015). Recent works (LeBlanc
and Koutsoukos, 2011, 2012) proposed a continuous-
time variation of the MSR algorithm, while in (Su and
Vaidya, 2017) the authors allowed agents to take as in-
put not only the information from their neighbors but
also the information provided by the agents that are
up to ` hops away. In (Dibaji et al., 2018; Dibaji and
Ishii, 2017), a modification of the MSR algorithm has
been proposed to solve the resilient consensus problem
for asynchronous multi-agent systems with quantized
communication and delays. The works (Sundaram and
Hadjicostis, 2011; Pasqualetti et al., 2012) proposed
a different approach to detect and identify malicious
agents, which is based on observability and reconstruc-
tion of the initial conditions. Other complementary ap-
proaches to the problem include adding trusted agents
(Abbas et al., 2018) and designing self-triggered control
strategies (Senejohnny et al., 2018).
1.1 Contributions of the paper
In this paper we combine differential privacy and re-
silient consensus in a multi-agent system with directed
communication topology. For such systems, we intro-
duce a distributed algorithm guaranteeing that consen-
sus can be attained by honest agents in presence of a cer-
tain number of malicious agents along with differential
privacy of their initial states. We characterize algorithm
correctness and accuracy. Moreover, in two special cases,
we show how differential privacy of the initial conditions
of the non-faulty agents can be guaranteed. The Differen-
tially Private MSR (DP-MSR) algorithm presented here
is the main contribution of this paper and, to the best of
our knowledge, this is the first algorithm that simulta-
neously handles differential privacy and fault tolerance
requirements over directed graphs. Indeed:
(i) in the literature on differentially private consensus
(Huang et al., 2012; Nozari et al., 2017; Mo and Mur-
ray, 2017), it is assumed that the graph topology is
undirected and that there are no malicious agents;
(ii) vice versa, the literature on resilient consensus (see
the related work section) considers agents evolving
over directed graphs but, in such works, no differen-
tially private mechanisms are considered.
2 Mathematical Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we denote byR,R>0, Z≥0 the set
of real numbers, positive real numbers and non-negative
integers, respectively. Let A ∈ Rn×n (x ∈ Rn); we de-
note by ‖A‖ (‖x‖) the Euclidean matrix (vector) norm
and by ‖A‖F = [tr(ATA)]1/2 the Frobenius norm (tr(·)
denotes the trace of a square matrix). Let A and B be
two sets, then |A| is the cardinality of A and we denote
byA∪B,A∩B andA\B the union, intersection and dif-
ference of the sets. Let (Rn)N denote the space of vector-
valued sequences in Rn. Then, for {x(k)}∞k=0 ∈ (Rn)N,
we set x := {x(k)}∞k=0 and xk := {x(h)}kh=0. For any
topological space, say X, we denote by B(X) the set of
Borel subsets of X. We denote by co{A} the closed con-
vex hull of the set A. Finally, we denote by 1 the column
vector of adequate dimension with all entries equal to 1,
and by In the identity matrix of size n.
2.1 Probability theory
Consider a probability space (Ω,Σ,P), where Ω is the
sample space, Σ is the collection of all the events, and P
is the probability measure, respectively. A random vari-
able is a measurable function X : ω ∈ Ω → R, and
we denote its expected value by E[X]. Chebyshev’s in-
equality states that, for any N ∈ R>0 and any ran-
dom variable X with finite expected value µ and finite
nonzero variance σ2, P{|X − µ| ≥ Nσ} ≤ 1N2 . We de-
note by X ∼ Lap(b) a zero mean random variable with
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Laplace distribution and variance 2b2, and with proba-
bility density function L(x; b) = 12be−
|x|
b for any x ∈ R.
Finally, consider the random n-dimensional vector X =
[X1, . . . , Xn]
T . The expected value ofX is a vector whose
elements are the expected value of elements of X, that is
E[X] = [E[X1], . . . ,E[Xn]]T , and the covariance matrix
ofX is Cov(X) = E[(X−E[X])(X−E[X])T ]. We denote
with var(X) the trace of the covariance matrix. That is,
var(X) = tr (Cov(X)) = E[XTX]− E[X]TE[X].
2.2 Directed graphs and r-robustness
We consider agents interacting over a network topol-
ogy modeled as a directed graph, or digraph. We de-
note a digraph by G(V, E), where V is the node set, and
E ⊆ V×V is the directed edge set. We denote the number
of nodes in the graph by n and we consider graphs for
which n ≥ 2. A directed edge is an ordered pair of dis-
tinct vertices and we denote by (j, i) ∈ E an edge from
node j ∈ V to node i ∈ V. In the context of this paper,
the directed edge (j, i) models the information flow from
agent j to agent i. The set of in-neighbors of node i is
denoted by Ni := {j ∈ V : (j, i) ∈ E}, and the in-degree
of node i, denoted by di, is the cardinality of this set.
Likewise, the set of out-neighbors of node i is defined as
N outi := {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E} and the out-degree is de-
noted by douti := |N outi |. In the rest of the paper, doutmax
is the maximum outgoing degree in the network, that
is, doutmax := maxi∈V{douti }. We also denote the minimum
in-degree by dinmin := mini∈V{di}. For a digraph G(V, E),
a nonempty subset S ⊂ V is an r-reachable set if there
exists a node i ∈ S such that |Ni \ S| ≥ r. That is, the
subset S has at least r in-neighbors in Ni \ S (LeBlanc
et al., 2013; Vaidya et al., 2012). This leads to the fol-
lowing concept of r-robustness for the digraph G(V, E)
that characterizes its local redundancy of information
flow (LeBlanc et al., 2013; Vaidya et al., 2012; Zhang
et al., 2015).
Definition 1 A digraph G(V, E) is r-robust if for every
pair of non-empty, disjoint subsets of V, at least one of
the subsets is r-reachable.
As in (LeBlanc et al., 2013), we say that a set S ⊂ V
is f -total if |S| ≤ f , f ∈ Z≥0. The set S is said to be
f -totally bounded if it is an f -total set.
2.3 Stochastic consensus
In (Huang et al., 2010; Huang, 2012) consensus algo-
rithms were considered, which can be written as
θ(k + 1) = A(k)θ(k) +H(k)v(k), k ≥ 0. (1)
In the above equation: (i) θ(k) = [θ1(k) . . . θn(k)]
T ∈
Rn denotes the states of n agents at time k; (ii) the
initial condition is θ0 = [θ0,1, . . . , θ0,n]
T , withE[‖θ0‖2] <
∞; (iii) v(k) ∈ Rm is a noise vector, with {v(k), k ≥
0} being a sequence of independent random vectors of
zero mean such that supk≥0 E[‖v(k)‖2] <∞. Moreover,
{A(k), k ≥ 0} and {H(k), k ≥ 0} are two sequences
of random matrices of appropriate dimensions. For each
fixed ω ∈ Ω, A(k, ω) is a row-stochastic matrix for all
k ≥ 0. We can now give the following from (Huang and
Manton, 2010; Huang et al., 2010; Huang, 2012).
Definition 2 The agents of a network are said to reach
mean square consensus if E
[|θi(k)|2] < ∞, ∀k ≥ 0,
i ∈ V, and there exists a random variable θ∞ such that
limk→∞ E
[|θi(k)− θ∞|2] = 0 for all i ∈ V.
In the above definition, convergence of θi(k) to θ∞ is
meant as convergence in mean square and in the rest of
the paper we simply say that θi(k) converges to θ∞. As
in (Huang, 2012), we define the backward product
Ψk,s := A(k − 1) . . . A(s), for k > s ≥ 0, Ψs,s := I.
Let Ψk,s(i, j) be the (i, j)-th element of Ψk,s. We say that
the backward product of the sequence of stochastic ma-
trices {A(k), k ≥ 0} is ergodic if limk→∞ |Ψk,s(i1, j) −
Ψk,s(i2, j)| = 0, for any given s ≥ 0, and i1, i2, j. The
following result from (Huang, 2012, Theorem 3) is also
used in this paper.
Theorem 1 Consider (1) and assume that:
(i) {v(k), k ≥ 0} is a sequence of independent random
vectors of zero mean with bounded variance;
(ii)
∑∞
k=0 E
[‖H(k)‖2F ]E [v(k)T v(k)] <∞;
(iii) {A(k), k ≥ 0} has ergodic backward product with
probability 1.
Then, for any initial state θ0 with bounded variance, sys-
tem (1) achieves mean square consensus.
3 Problem Formulation
We now formalize the problem statement and, in order to
do so, we first introduce the notions of adversary agent,
resilient consensus and differential privacy. To this aim,
consider a multi-agent system of n agents evolving on a
digraph G(V, E). The internal state of the i-th agent at
time k ∈ Z≥0 is denoted by θi(k) ∈ R and by θi,0 := θi(0)
its initial condition. The message sent at time k from
agent i is xi(k) ∈ R, while the messages received by
agent i at time k from its in-neighbors are denoted by
{xj(k), j ∈ Ni}. The internal state of agent i ∈ V is
updated according to some update rule of the form
θi(k+ 1) = gi (k, θi(k), {xj(k), j ∈ Ni}) , k ∈ Z≥0, (2)
while the message sent by the i-th agent at time k is
generated as
xi(k) = h (θi(k), ηi(k)) , k ∈ Z≥0, (3)
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with ηi(k) ∈ R being some noise injected by agent i
at time k with some arbitrary distribution. We remark
that the update rule gi(·) may be different from agent
to agent, while the function h(·) is the same for all the
agents, i.e. agents use the same communication policy.
3.1 Adversary model and resilient consensus
Suppose that the network node set V is partitioned into a
set of normal or non-faulty nodes, evolving according to
(2) and (3), and a set of adversary or faulty nodesF ⊂ V.
Moreover, |F| = φ ≤ f , i.e. the set of faulty nodes is
f -totally bounded (only the upper bound f is known
and not the actual φ). We use the following classification
from (LeBlanc et al., 2013).
Definition 3 An agent i ∈ F is said to be Byzantine if
it does not send the same value to all of its neighbors at
some time-step, or if it does not follow the same update
rule as the non-faulty agents. An agent i ∈ F is said
to be malicious if it sends the same value to all of its
neighbors, but it does not follow the same update rule as
the non-faulty agents.
Both malicious and Byzantine agents are allowed to up-
date their states arbitrarily and can collude among them.
Furthermore, the faulty agents are often assumed to be
omniscient, i.e. they know the network topology, the dy-
namics of the other agents and their initial conditions.
Note that all malicious agents are Byzantine but not
vice versa. Therefore, Byzantine agents are more general
and in this paper we use the terminology faulty agent to
denote both Byzantine and malicious agents.
Each faulty agent i ∈ F can send a different, arbi-
trary, attack signal x̂ji (k) to each of its out-neighbors,
j ∈ N outi . The attack signals x̂ji are injected by the faulty
agents into the network to steer the multi-agent system
towards some malicious consensus state θ̂∞. In applica-
tions, this malicious state θ̂∞ may either be dangerous
for the integrity of the multi-agent system or it may be
defined to corrupt the computation carried out by the
network. Given that faulty agents are omniscient (worst
case situation), the signal x̂ji (k) depends on the mali-
cious consensus state θ̂∞ and on the present and past
internal state history of non-faulty nodes V \ F . That is,
x̂ji (k) = ĥ
j
i
(
θ̂∞; θ(0), . . . , θ(k)
)
, k ∈ Z≥0, (4)
where θ(k) = [θ1(k), . . . , θn−φ(k)]T is the stack vector
of internal state of non-faulty nodes at time k. In the
context of this paper, the non-faulty agents neither are
aware of the attack law in (4) nor are interested to detect
and isolate the faulty agents. In what follows, we denote
with the hat all the quantities related to faulty agents.
We are now ready to give the following definition,
adapted from (LeBlanc et al., 2013; Vaidya et al., 2012;
Huang and Manton, 2009).
Definition 4 The non-faulty agents are said to achieve
resilient asymptotic consensus if for any choice of their
initial values the following two conditions are verified:
• Validity: minj∈V\F E
[
θj(k)
] ≤ E[θi(k + 1)] ≤
maxj∈V\F E
[
θj(k)
]
, for all k ≥ 0 and i ∈ V \ F ;
• Convergence: limk→∞ E
[|θi(k) − θj(k)|2] = 0, for all
i, j ∈ V \ F , i 6= j.
Definition 4 implies that non-faulty agents achieve mean
square consensus to a value that is between the smallest
and largest values of their initial conditions. A consen-
sus algorithm that guarantees both the validity and the
convergence conditions is said to be correct, see (LeBlanc
et al., 2013; Vaidya et al., 2012; Huang and Manton,
2009).
3.2 Differential privacy
We introduce differential privacy by closely following
(Nozari et al., 2017). Here, we let θ(k), x(k) and η(k)
be the stack vectors of all states/attack signals, mes-
sages sent and generated noises at time k in the whole
network, respectively. These vectors are in Rm, with
m = (n− φ) +∑i∈F douti . We denote by η = {η(k)}∞k=0
the sequence of vector noise on the total sample space
Ω = (Rm)N. Given an initial state θ0, the sequences
of random vector variables x = {x(k)}∞k=0 and θ ={θ(k)}∞k=0 are uniquely determined by η. Therefore, the
function Xθ0 : (Rm)N → (Rm)N such that Xθ0(η) = x is
well defined and represents the observation correspond-
ing to the execution (θ0,η).
Definition 5 Given δ ∈ R≥0, the initial states of the
non-faulty agents of the network θ
(1)
0 and θ
(2)
0 are δ-
adjacent if, for some i0 ∈ V \F , |θ(2)0,i −θ(1)0,i | ≤ δ if i = i0
and |θ(2)0,i − θ(1)0,i | = 0 if i 6= i0, for i ∈ V \ F . Given
δ, ε ∈ R≥0, the network dynamics is ε-differentially pri-
vate if, for any pair θ
(1)
0 and θ
(2)
0 of δ-adjacent initial
states and any set O ∈ B ((Rn−φ)N),
P{η ∈ Ω|X
θ
(1)
0
(η) ∈ O} ≤ eεP{η ∈ Ω|X
θ
(2)
0
(η) ∈ O}.
(5)
We also give a definition of accuracy, which is adapted
from (Nozari et al., 2017).
Definition 6 For p ∈ [0, 1] and r ∈ R≥0, the network
dynamics is (p, r)-accurate if, for any initial condition,
the state of each non-faulty agent converges, in any sense,
as k → ∞ to a random variable θ∞, with E [θ∞] < ∞,
and P{|θ∞ − E[θ∞]| ≤ r} ≥ 1− p.
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3.3 Problem statement
Given the set-up described above, consider a multi-agent
system and assume that a f -totally bounded set of faulty
agents exists, F ⊂ V. Our goal in this paper is to de-
sign a distributed consensus algorithm ensuring that: (i)
resilient asymptotic consensus is achieved by the non-
faulty agents with (p, r)-accuracy. That is, the algorithm
allows the non-faulty agents to achieve consensus despite
the presence of faulty agents trying to steer the multi-
agent system toward some malicious consensus state θ̂∞;
(ii) ε-differential privacy of the initial conditions of non-
faulty agents is guaranteed when faulty agents behave
arbitrarily within the communication policy adopted in
the system. The algorithm presented in this paper con-
sists of: (i) an update law of the form (2); (ii) an inter-
agent message generator of the form (3); (iii) the distri-
bution of the noise processes ηi(k).
4 The DP-MSR algorithm
We propose a modification of the original MSR algo-
rithm, which we term as Differentially Private MSR al-
gorithm (DP-MSR). The key steps of the DP-MSR al-
gorithm are summarized as pseudo-code in Algorithm 1.
An agent that follows the DP-MSR: (i) transmits to its
neighbors a message that is corrupted with noise (rather
than its internal state as in the MSR). Note that the
Transmit phase in Algorithm 1 defines the communica-
tion policy of the network; (ii) discards, as in the MSR,
some of the (noisy) messages from the neighbors before
updating its internal state. In Section 5 we character-
ize correctness, accuracy and differential privacy of the
DP-MSR algorithm. In particular, we show that these
properties are related to the topology of the underlying
graph G.
Following Algorithm 1, each agent i executes at every
time step k the following three actions:
(1) Transmit phase: agent i transmits to all its out-
neighbors the message xi, generated as
xi(k) = θi(k) + ηi(k), (6)
where ηi(k) is a zero-mean noise with Laplacian
distribution ηi(k) ∼ Lap(b(k)) and b(k) = c qk,
c > 0, 12 < q < 1;
(2) Receive phase: agent i receives the messages
{xj(k), j ∈ Ni} from all its in-neighbors. These
values are used to create the vector ri(k) with
dimension |Ni(k)|;
(3) Update phase: agent i stores the values contained
in ri(k) and removes from such a vector the small-
est f values and the largest f values (breaking ties
arbitrarily). We denote by N ∗i (k) the set of in-
neighbors of the i-th agent whose values have not
Algorithm 1 DP-MSR
Variables:
θi(k) internal state of agent i at time k
ηi(k) independent zero-mean noise with Laplace distribu-
tion, i.e. ηi(k) ∼ Lap(b(k)), with: b(k) = c qk, and c > 0,
1
2
< q < 1 being two design parameters
f design parameter
Initialization:
Set θi(0)← θ0,i and ai ← 1/ (|Ni| − 2f + 1)
while True do
Transmit phase
Send to each out-neighbor xi(k)← θi(k) + ηi(k)
Receive phase
Get xj(k) from each in-neighbor
Store the values in the vector ri(k) of size |Ni|
Update phase
Remove from ri(k) the largest and smallest f values
Compute:
θi(k + 1)← aiθi(k) +
∑
j∈N∗i (k)
aixj(k),
where N ∗i (k) is the set of in-neighbors that have not been
removed from ri(k)
end while
been removed. Clearly, |N ∗i (k)| = |Ni(k)| − 2f .
Then, agent i updates its internal state as
θi(k + 1) = aiθi(k) +
∑
j∈N∗
i
(k)
aixj(k), (7)
with ai =
1
|N∗i (k)|+1 =
1
|Ni|−2f+1 (that is, the agent
takes the average of its internal state θi(k) and the
remaining messages in ri(k)). Note that the ai’s
only depend on f and on the topology of the graph
G(V, E).
5 Properties of the DP-MSR algorithm
We now investigate correctness, accuracy and differen-
tial privacy of Algorithm 1.
5.1 Correctness
We show that if the network topology is sufficiently ro-
bust, then Algorithm 1 is correct according to Definition
4. This is done by proving that: (i) each non-faulty agent
i ∈ V\F (described by the stochastic process θi(k)) con-
verges in mean square to some common random variable
θ∞, despite the presence of up to f faulty agents in the
network (convergence condition); (ii) for each non-faulty
agent i ∈ V \F , E[θi(k+1)] is the convex combination of
{E[θj(k)]}, j ∈ V \ F , for k ∈ Z≥0 (validity condition).
Lemma 1 Consider the multi-agent system (6)-
(7) and without loss of generality suppose that the
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first n − φ agents are non-faulty and let θ(k) =
[θ1(k), . . . , θn−φ(k)]T . Assume that the network topol-
ogy is at least (2f + 1)-robust, then the dynamics of the
non-faulty agents can be expressed as
θi(k + 1) = Mi(k)θ(k) +
∑
j∈N∗
i
(k)
aiηj(k), (8)
with i ∈ {1, . . . , n−φ} and Mi(k) being a row-stochastic
vector of size (n − φ) having the following properties:
(1) the i-th element of Mi(k), say Mii(k), is such that
Mii(k) = ai; (2) the j-th element of Mi(k), i.e. Mij(k)
is non-zero only if (j, i) ∈ E; (3) ∀k, at least |Ni ∩ (V \
F)|−f+1 elements of Mi(k) are lower bounded by some
positive constant.
Proof. This lemma can be proved by using arguments
similar to those presented in (Vaidya, 2012; Su and
Vaidya, 2017), where an analogous result was proved
in the case where there is no noise in the network (i.e.
ηi = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n). By combining (6) and (7) the
closed loop dynamics of non-faulty agents can be writ-
ten as
θi(k + 1) = aiθi(k) +
∑
j∈N∗
i
(k)
ai(θj(k) + ηj(k))
=
∑
j∈{i}∪N∗
i
(k)
aiθj(k) +
∑
j∈N∗
i
(k)
aiηj(k).
(9)
Note that the set N ∗i (k) in the above dynamics may
contain values coming from faulty agents. Indeed, faulty
agents might generate values between the f largest and
the f smallest values received by a non-faulty agent and
therefore those values would not be eliminated by the
algorithm. In this case, as shown in details in (Vaidya,
2012), under the hypothesis that the network topology is
(2f+1)-robust, it is always possible to express the value
θj(k) from any faulty agent inN ∗i (k) as the convex com-
bination of those of the non-faulty agents in Ni \N ∗i (k),
that were removed “accidentally” by the algorithm. 
Lemma 1 states that the time evolution of the non-faulty
agent can be conveniently expressed as in (8) and, more-
over, the noise-free term Mi(k)θ(k) depends only on the
non-faulty agents.
Proposition 1 Consider the multi-agent system (6)-
(7). Assume that the network topology is at least (2f+1)-
robust. Then, the DP-MSR algorithm is correct and the
closed loop dynamics (9) reaches mean square consen-
sus, i.e. there exists a random variable θ∞ such that
limk→∞ E
[|θi(k)− θ∞|2] = 0 for all i ∈ V \ F .
Proof. Without loss of generality, the attack signal (4)
can be modeled as the second order random process
x̂ji (k) = θ̂
j
i (k) + η̂
j
i (k),
where θ̂ji (k) : Z≥0 → R is some arbitrary determinis-
tic signal, and η̂ji (k) is a zero-mean white noise with
bounded variance σ̂2i,j(k), for all k ≥ 0, and such that∑∞
k=0 σ̂
2
i,j(k) <∞.
Now, from Lemma 1 the evolution of a non-faulty agent
can be expressed as in (8). Therefore, by taking the ex-
pected value we get E [θi(k + 1)] = Mi(k)E [θ(k)], k ≥ 0.
Since Mi is a stochastic vector, then the validity condi-
tion as in Definition 4 is satisfied for all k ≥ 0.
We can prove convergence by means of Theorem 1 after
noticing that (8) can be written in compact form as
θ(k + 1) = M(k)θ(k) + η˘(k), (10)
where M(k) is a (n−φ)× (n−φ) row-stochastic matrix
and
η˘i(k) =
∑
j∈N∗
i
(k)\Qi(k)
aiηj(k) +
∑
j∈Qi(k)
aiη̂
i
j(k), (11)
with Qi(k) = N ∗i (k) ∩ F being the set of faulty agents
in N ∗i (k) at time k. Indeed, observe that the dynam-
ics (10) has the same form as (1), with A(k) = M(k),
H(k) = In−φ, v(k) = η˘(k) and that hypothesis (i) of
such theorem is satisfied by construction (recall indeed
that η˘(k) is a sequence of independent random vectors
with zero-mean and bounded covariance). We now show
that hypotheses (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 1 are also sat-
isfied by (10). To show that (ii) holds, we note that,
in this case,
∑∞
k=0 E
[
tr
(
H(k)TH(k)
)]
E
[
v(k)T v(k)
]
=
(n− φ) ∑∞k=0 E [η˘T (k)η˘(k)] and hence
∞∑
k=0
E
[
η˘T (k)η˘(k)
]
≤
∞∑
k=0
n−φ∑
i=1
a2i
(|N ∗i (k) \ Qi(k)| 2b2(k) + |Qi(k)| σ̂2j,i(k))
≤
∞∑
k=0
n−φ∑
i=1
a2i |N ∗i (k)|max{2b2(k), σ̂2j,i(k)}
≤ (n− f)2
∞∑
k=0
max{2b2(k), σ̂2j,i(k)} <∞,
where we used the fact that 0 < ai ≤ 1, that the variance
of the noise signals goes to zero, and that, for each agent
i, the quantity |N ∗i (k)| = |Ni| − 2f is constant for all
k ≥ 0 and such that |N ∗i (k)| ≤ (n−1)−2f ≤ n−f.Now,
hypothesis (iii) of Theorem 1 can be shown by noting
that, since the network is (2f + 1)-robust, then from
(Vaidya, 2012, Theorem 1) we can immediately conclude
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that the sequence {M(k), k ≥ 0} has ergodic backward
product. Therefore, Theorem 1 holds and hence we can
conclude that there exists a random variable θ∞ such
that limk→∞ E
[|θi(k)− θ∞|2] = 0, for all i ∈ V \ F .
This proves the result. 
5.2 Accuracy
Next we analyze the statistical properties of θ∞, together
with the accuracy of the algorithm.
Proposition 2 Consider the multi-agent system (6)-
(7). Assume that the network topology is at least (3f+1)-
robust, then the random variable θ∞ towards which the
state of non-faulty agents, θi(k), converges as k →∞ is
such that E [θ∞] = wT θ0, for some vector w ∈ Rn having
nonnegative elements with 1Tw = 1, and
2 c2 mini a
2
i
n(1− q2) ≤ var (θ∞) ≤
c2 (n− f)
2(1− q2) . (12)
Proof. Proposition 1 implies that limk→∞ E
[‖θ(k) −
θ∞1‖2
]
= 0, which in turns implies that limk→∞ E [θ(k)] =
E [θ∞1]. Denoting with Ψk,s the backward product of
the sequence {M(k), k ≥ 0}, from equation (10) we get
θ(k) = Ψk,0 θ0 +
k−1∑
h=0
Ψk,h+1η˘(h), k ≥ 0.
Now, from the fact that E [η˘(k)] = 0, ∀k ≥ 0, and since
the sequence {M(k), k ≥ 0} has ergodic backward prod-
uct, it follows that limk→∞ E [θ(k)] = limk→∞Ψk,0 θ0 =
1wT θ0, for some w ∈ Rn such that 1Tw = 1 (Ren and
Beard, 2005, Lemma 3.7). Hence, we have that E [θ∞] =
wT θ0. Now, since
θ(k)T θ(k) = θT0 Ψ
T
k,0Ψk,0θ0 + 2
k−1∑
h=0
θT0 Ψ
T
k,0Ψk,h+1η˘(h)
+
k−1∑
h=0
η˘T (h)ΨTk,h+1Ψk,h+1η˘(h)
and
E
[
k−1∑
h=0
θT0 Ψ
T
k,0Ψk,h+1η˘(h)
]
= E
[
k−1∑
h=0
ζTh η˘(h)
]
= 0,
for some vectors ζh ∈ Rn, we have that
var(θ(k)) = E
[
θT (k)θ(k)
]− E [θ(k)]T E [θ(k)]
=
k−1∑
h=0
E
[
η˘T (h)ΨTk,h+1Ψk,h+1η˘(h)
]
=
k−1∑
h=0
n−φ∑
i=1
var (η˘i(h))
(
ΨTk,h+1Ψk,h+1
)
ii
,
having taken into account that η˘i are independent ran-
dom variables. Now, from Proposition 1 it also follows
that limk→∞ var(θi(k)) = var(θ∞) and hence we have
var(θ∞) =
1
n− φ limk→∞ var(θ(k))
=
1
n− φ limk→∞
k−1∑
h=0
n−φ∑
i=1
var (η˘i(h))
(
ΨTk,h+1Ψk,h+1
)
ii
.
(13)
Based on this, we now give upper and lower bounds on
var(θ∞).
Upper bound: Consider the worst-case scenario where
every faulty agent injects noise η̂ji (k). Without loss of
generality, we can assume that
σ̂2i,j(k) ≤ 2b2(k) = 2c2 q2k, k ∈ Z≥0,
i.e. σ̂2i,j(k) decays at least as the variance of the non-
faulty agents in (6) and any difference from this is taken
into account in θ̂ij(k). From the hypothesis on the ro-
bustness of the network, we have that |Ni| ≥ 3f+1, and
so ai =
1
|Ni|−2f+1 ≤ 1f+2 < 12 , for every node i ∈ V \ F .
Hence, from (11) and recalling that |N ∗i (k)| ≤ n− f , we
have that var (η˘i(h)) ≤ (n−f)a2i σ̂2j,i(h) ≤ 12 (n−f)c2 q2h.
Therefore, from (13) we get
var(θ∞) ≤ n− f
2(n− φ) limk→∞
k−1∑
h=0
n−φ∑
i=1
c2 q2h
(
ΨTk,h+1Ψk,h+1
)
ii
≤ n− f
2(n− φ) limk→∞
k−1∑
h=0
c2 q2h tr
(
ΨTk,h+1Ψk,h+1
)
≤ n− f
2
∞∑
h=0
c2 q2h =
c2 (n− f)
2(1− q2) ,
where we used the fact that, for anym×m row-stochastic
matrix Ψ, it holds that tr(ΨTΨ) = tr(ΨΨT ) ≤ m.
Lower bound: In the case that the faulty agents do not
add any noise to their signals, i.e. η̂ij(k) = 0, from (11) we
have that var (η˘i(h)) = |N ∗i (h) \ Qi(h)| a2i 2b2(h). Again,
from the hypothesis on the robustness of the network
we have that |N ∗i (h) \ Qi(h)| = |Ni| − 2f − |Qi(h)| ≥
7
3f + 1−2f −φ ≥ 1 for all i and h ≥ 0. Hence, from (13)
we get
var(θ∞) ≥ 1
n− φ limk→∞
k−1∑
h=0
n−φ∑
i=1
a2i 2b
2(h)
(
ΨTk,h+1Ψk,h+1
)
ii
≥ 1
n
lim
k→∞
k−1∑
h=0
[
min
i
(a2i )2c
2q2h
]
tr
(
ΨTk,h+1Ψk,h+1
)
≥ 2 c
2 mini a
2
i
n
∞∑
h=0
q2h =
2 c2 mini a
2
i
n(1− q2) ,
where we used the fact that, for any row-stochastic ma-
trix Ψ, it holds that tr(ΨTΨ) = ‖Ψ‖2F ≥ 1. 
Remark 1 Note that (3f + 1)-robustness is required to
obtain a nonzero lower bound in (12) independently on
the network topology (the upper bound, instead, only re-
quires (2f + 1)-robustness). The fact that the network
is (3f + 1)-robust guarantees that, after Algorithm 1 re-
moves 2f messages coming from in-neighbors, at least
one of the remaining f + 1 messages comes from a noisy
non-faulty agent in N ∗i . On the other hand, even a slight
relaxation of this condition, say the network is 3f -robust,
would not allow to get a nonzero lower bound on var(θ∞)
for every network topology. Indeed, for any 3f -robust
network we know that |Ni| ≥ 3f , for all i, hence |N ∗i (h)\Qi(h)| = |Ni|−2f −|Qi(h)| ≥ 3f −2f −φ ≥ f −f = 0.
Therefore, if the messages received by some non-faulty
agent do not contain any noise, i.e. η̂ij(h) = 0, ∀i, j,
h ≥ 0, then from (11) it follows that for some i and h
it may occur that var(η˘i(h)) = 0. In other words, there
exists a 3f -robust network such that the lower bound on
var(θ∞) is zero.
Proposition 3 Under same assumptions of Proposi-
tion 2, Algorithm 1 is
(
p, c
√
(n−f)
2p(1−q2)
)
-accurate for any
p ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. From Chebyshev’s inequality it follows that
P{|θ∞ − wT θ0| ≤ r} ≥ 1− var(θ∞)
r2
≥ 1− var(θ∞)
r2
,
where we denoted by var(θ∞) the upper bound in (12).
Now, by picking p = var(θ∞)/r2 it follows that r =√
var(θ∞)
p = c
√
(n−f)
2p(1−q2) . 
As in (Nozari et al., 2017), it follows that the ideal case
of (0, 0)-accuracy cannot be obtained because the radius
r is a decreasing function of p.
5.3 Differential privacy
We now investigate the ε-differential privacy proper-
ties of the algorithm. To this aim, we consider two im-
portant special cases: (i) absence of faulty agents, i.e.
φ = 0; (ii) presence of φ 6= 0 faulty agents that, simi-
larly to (Sundaram and Hadjicostis, 2011), behave arbi-
trarily within the communication policy of the network,
i.e. η̂ji (k) ∼ Lap(̂b(k)), with b̂(k) = c qk. A key differ-
ence between the model considered here and the one in
(Sundaram and Hadjicostis, 2011) is that in the latter
it is assumed that faulty agents send the same value to
their neighbors. In our case, omniscient faulty agents
have the capability to adapt their attack signals to the
initial conditions of non-faulty agents to drive the multi-
agent system towards some malicious consensus value
θ̂∞. Specifically, let θ
(1)
0 and θ
(2)
0 be two δ-adjacent ini-
tial conditions of non-faulty agents and let θ̂
j,(1)
i (k) and
θ̂
j,(2)
i (k) be the corresponding input attack signals in-
jected by the i-th faulty agent to steer the multi-agent
system towards the same θ̂∞. Then, without loss of gen-
erality, the two input signals are such that
θ̂
j,(2)
i (k) = θ̂
j,(1)
i (k) + δ̂
j
i (k), (14)
where δ̂ji (k) converges to zero faster than the noise in-
jected by the agents, that is |δ̂ji (k)| ≤ δ¯ λk, with δ¯ ≥ 1,
0 < λ < q.
Proposition 4 Consider the multi-agent system (6)-(7)
and let δ be the adjacency bound of the initial conditions
of non-faulty agents. The following statements hold:
(i) if φ = 0, then ε¯-differential privacy of the agents is
guaranteed, where ε¯ = δ 2qc (2q−1) ,
1
2 < q < 1;
(ii) if φ 6= 0, φ < f , with η̂ji (k) ∼ Lap(c qk), for all i, j
and k ≥ 0, then ε-differential privacy is guaranteed
for non-faulty agents, with ε = ε¯+ δ¯
f doutmax q
c (q−λ) .
Proof. The proof follows similar steps and notation to
those presented in (Nozari et al., 2017; Huang et al.,
2012). Essentially, equation (5) is proved by establishing
a bijective correspondence between any two executions
(θ
(1)
0 ,η
(1)) and (θ
(2)
0 ,η
(2)) that generate the same ob-
servations (that is, such that X
θ
(1)
0
(η(1)) = X
θ
(2)
0
(η(2)))
and then by evaluating the probability by integrat-
ing over all the possible executions starting from the
same δ-adjacent initial conditions. Without loss of
generality, assume that the agents from 1 to n − φ
are non-faulty, and that the agents from (n − φ + 1)
through n are faulty. At a generic time instant h the
vector noise generated by all the agents is given as
η =
[
η1 . . . ηn−φ η̂Tn−φ+1 . . . η̂
T
n
]T
. That is, the first
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n − φ components of η are the ηi ∈ R generated by
non-faulty agents, while η̂i =
[
η̂1i . . . η̂
douti
i
]T
, i ∈ F ,
is the noise generated by the i-th faulty agent and re-
ceived by each of its douti out-neighbors (recall that
faulty agents can send a different noise signal to each
of their out-neighbors). Moreover, note that the vec-
tor η ∈ Rm, where m = (n − φ) + ∑φi=1 douti . Con-
sider now any pair of δ-adjacent initial conditions θ
(1)
0
and θ
(2)
0 of the non-faulty agents and an arbitrary
set O ⊂ (Rm)N of observations. For any k ≥ 0, let
R
(`)
k = {ηk ∈ Ωk|Xk,θ(`)0 (ηk) ∈ Ok}, ` = 1, 2, where
Ωk = Rm(k+1) being the sample space up to time k, and
Ok ⊆ Rm(k+1) being the set of observations obtained
by truncating the elements of O to finite subsequences
of length k + 1. Hence, by the continuity of probability
(Durrett, 2010, Theorem 1.1.1.iv)
P{η ∈ Ω|X
θ
(`)
0
(ηk) ∈ O} = lim
k→∞
∫
R
(`)
k
fm(k+1)(η
(`)
k )dη
(`)
k ,
for ` = 1, 2, where fm(k+1) is the m(k + 1)-dimensional
joint probability distribution given as
fm(k+1)(ηk)
=
k∏
h=0
[ n−φ∏
i=1
L(ηi(h); b(h)) ·
n∏
i=n−φ+1
douti∏
j=1
L(η̂ji (h); b̂(h))
]
=
k∏
h=0
n−φ∏
i=1
L(ηi(h); b(h)) ·
k∏
h=0
n∏
i=n−φ+1
douti∏
j=1
L(η̂ji (h); b̂(h))
= f(n−φ)(k+1)(ηk) · f̂(m−n+φ)(k+1)(ηk).
(15)
Now, without loss of generality, assume that θ
(2)
0,i0
=
θ
(1)
0,i0
+δ1 for some i0 ∈ {1, . . . , n−φ}, where 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ δ,
and θ
(2)
0,i = θ
(1)
0,i for all i 6= i0. Then, for any η(1)k ∈ R(1)k ,
define η
(2)
k as
η
(2)
i (h) =
{
η
(1)
i (h)− ahi δ1, if i = i0,
η
(1)
i (h), if i 6= i0,
(16)
for h ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Then, from (6), for i = i0 we have
x
(2)
i0
(0) = θ
(2)
0,i0
+ η
(2)
i0
(0) = θ
(1)
0,i0
+ δ1 + η
(1)
i0
(0) − δ1 =
x
(1)
i0
(0), while for i 6= i0 we have x(2)i (0) = θ(2)0,i +η(2)i (0) =
θ
(1)
0,i + η
(1)
i (0) = x
(1)
i (0). That is, (16) implies x
(2)(0) =
x(1)(0). Since Algorithm 1 performs only deterministic
operations on the data that receives as an input (in
fact, it first sorts the values and then cuts the smallest
f and largest f values), then x(2)(0) = x(1)(0) implies
N ∗,(2)i (0) = N ∗,(1)i (0), for i ∈ {1, . . . , n − φ} (i.e. the
sets N ∗i generated from the two δ-adjacent conditions
are the same, because in both cases the same values are
removed by the algorithm). Therefore, by induction, it
can be easily shown that from (16) we get θ
(2)
i (h) =
θ
(1)
i (h) + a
h
i δ1, if i = i0, and θ
(2)
i (h) = θ
(1)
i (h), if i 6= i0,
and also x(2)(h) = x(1)(h), which implies N ∗,(2)i (h) =
N ∗,(1)i (h), for i ∈ {1, . . . , n − φ} and h ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
That is, X
k,θ
(1)
0
(η
(1)
k ) = Xk,θ(2)0
(η
(2)
k ), so η
(2) ∈ R(2)k ,
and this defines a bijective correspondence between the
two executions. Hence, for any η
(2)
k ∈ R(2)k there ex-
ists a unique (η
(1)
k ,∆ηk) ∈ R(1)k ×R(n−φ)(k+1) such that
η
(2)
k = η
(1)
k + ∆ηk, where ∆ηk is fixed. Therefore, using
a change of variable as in (Nozari et al., 2017), we get
P{η ∈ Ω|X
θ
(2)
0
(η) ∈ O} = limk→∞
∫
R
(1)
k
fm(k+1)(η
(1)
k +
∆ηk)dη
(1)
k .
Now, we first prove statement (i) of the proposition (i.e.
φ = 0) and then we prove statement (ii).
Proof of statement (i): In this case φ = 0. This im-
plies that fm(k+1)(ηk) defined in (15) is simply equal to
f(n−φ)(k+1)(ηk). Hence, the relation between the proba-
bility of any subsequence of an individual execution η
(1)
k
and its corresponding execution η
(2)
k for a particular ob-
servation is given by
f(n−φ)(k+1)(η
(1)
k )
f(n−φ)(k+1)(η
(1)
k +∆ηk)
=
k∏
h=0
n−φ∏
i=1
L(η(1)i (h); b(h))
k∏
h=0
n−φ∏
i=1
L(η(1)i (h)+∆ηi(h); b(h))
=
k∏
h=0
L(η(1)i0 (h); b(h))
k∏
h=0
L(η(1)i0 (h)+∆ηi0(h); b(h))
≤
k∏
h=0
e
|∆ηi0 (h)|
b(h)
≤ e
k∑
h=0
ah
i0
δ
cqh ≤ e
δ
c
k∑
h=0
( 12q )
h
(17)
where the last step follows from ai < 1/2. Thus, we have
f(n−φ)(k+1)(η
(1)
k ) ≤ e
δ
c
k∑
h=0
( 12q )
h
f(n−φ)(k+1)(η
(1)
k +∆ηk).
(18)
Therefore, integrating both sides of (18) over all the exe-
cutionsR
(1)
k , taking the limit for k →∞ and considering
that the geometric series in the exponent is convergent
since from the hypotheses 12 < q < 1, we have
P{η ∈ Ω|X
θ
(1)
0
(η) ∈ O} ≤ eδ 2qc (2q−1)P{η ∈ Ω|X
θ
(2)
0
(η) ∈ O}.
The result is then proved by definition of differential
privacy.
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Proof of statement (ii): Now, in this case φ > 0. For any
η
(1)
k define
η̂
j,(2)
i (h) = η̂
j,(1)
i (h)− δ̂ji (h), (19)
for h = {0, . . . , k}. Similarly to what has been previ-
ously done, it can be shown that x
j,(2)
i (0) = θ̂
j,(2)
i (0) +
η̂
j,(2)
i (0) = θ̂
j,(1)
i (0)+ δ̂
j
i (0)+ η̂
j,(1)
i (0)− δ̂ji (0) = xj,(1)i (0).
Therefore, also in this case, due to the deterministic op-
erations carried out by Algorithm 1 on its input data, we
have that N ∗,(2)i (0) = N ∗,(1)i (0), for i = {1, . . . , n− φ},
and hence, from (16) and (19), by induction, we have
again X
k,θ
(1)
0
(η
(1)
k ) = Xk,θ(2)0
(η
(2)
k ). Thus, from (15), the
relation between probabilities of any of these two corre-
sponding executions is given by
fm(k+1)(η
(1)
k )
fm(k+1)(η
(2)
k )
=
f(n−φ)(k+1)(η
(1)
k )
f(n−φ)(k+1)(η
(2)
k )
· f̂(m−n+φ)(k+1)(η
(1)
k )
f̂(m−n+φ)(k+1)(η
(2)
k )
,
(20)
where the first term is given in (17) and the second one,
omitting (m− n+ φ)(k + 1) in the subscripts, is
f̂(η
(1)
k )
f̂(η
(1)
k +∆ηk)
=
k∏
h=0
n∏
i=n−φ+1
douti∏
j=1
L(η̂j,(1)i (h); b̂(h))
k∏
h=0
n∏
i=n−φ+1
dout
i∏
j=1
L(η̂j,(1)i (h)+∆η̂ji (h); b̂(h))
≤
k∏
h=0
n∏
i=n−φ+1
douti∏
j=1
e
|∆ηˆj
i
(h)|
bˆ(h) ≤
k∏
h=0
e
φdoutmax δ¯λ
h
cqh ≤e
δ¯fdoutmax
c
k∑
h=0
(λq )
h
where we used the bound in (14). Combining the above
two relations and (17) we finally get
fm(k+1)(η
(1)
k ) ≤ e
δ
c
k∑
h=0
( 12q )
h
+
δ¯fdoutmax
c
k∑
h=0
(λq )
h
fm(k+1)(η
(1)
k +∆ηk).
In the same way as before, integrating over all the pos-
sible executions, using a change of variables and taking
the limit, we finally get
P{η ∈ Ω|X
θ
(1)
0
(η) ∈ O} ≤ eε¯+δ¯
f doutmaxq
c (q−λ) P{η ∈ Ω|X
θ
(2)
0
(η) ∈ O},
that establishes the desired result by definition of differ-
ential privacy. 
Note that, if the convergence to zero of δ̂ji (k) in (14) is
in one-step, i.e. λ = 0, then ε = ε¯ + δ¯
f doutmax
c . Moreover,
if δ¯ = 0, i.e. the faulty agents are not completely omni-
scient, then Proposition 4 implies that faulty agents do
not perturb the differential privacy of the multi-agent
system.
Remark 2 The major difference of Proposition 4 in the
case φ = 0 with respect to the results in (Nozari et al.,
2017) is that we consider directed graphs whose topology
changes over time, due to the operations performed by
Algorithm 1. With respect to this, we note that the only
feature of Algorithm 1 used in the previous proof is that
the algorithm performs deterministic operations on its
input data. Hence, the proof is valid for any deterministic
algorithm.
6 Simulation example
We now report simulation results for a multi-agent sys-
tem of n = 25 agents having f = 1 faulty agent (say,
agent 1). The agents interact over a circulant digraph
where each agent communicates with 8 agents ahead. It
can be shown that such a graph is 4-robust, see (Use-
vitch and Panagou, 2017, Theorem 1). Initial conditions
of the non-faulty agents are taken from the standard
normal distribution and are kept the same across the
simulations. At each time-step k, non-faulty agents up-
date their internal state and send messages to their out-
neighbors in accordance to the DP-MSR, while the faulty
agent sends the message xˆj1(k) = 0.5 sin(k) + η
j
1(k),
where j ∈ N out1 and ηj1(k) ∼ Lap(ĉ q̂k), with q̂ = 0.9 and
ĉ = 0.8. We set the parameters in Algorithm 1 to c = 1
and q = 0.75. Since the graph is 4-robust, then the DP-
MSR algorithm is correct (Proposition 1) and the sys-
tem reaches mean square consensus to some value of the
random variable θ∞, whose expected value E[θ∞] is con-
tained between the smallest and the largest values of the
initial conditions of the non-faulty agents. This predic-
tion is confirmed in Figure 1. In Figure 2, the statistical
distribution of θ∞ is shown, which has been obtained by
running 104 simulations. Further, we numerically found
that var (θ∞) ≈ 0.05, in accordance with the theoreti-
cal bound defined in (12), that is 0.0037 ≤ var(θ∞) ≤
27.4286.
Fig. 1. Time evolution of the internal states of non-faulty
agents for the multi-agent system in Section 6. The time
evolution of the attack signal sent by the faulty agent is
denoted by a cross.
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Fig. 2. Statistical distribution of θ∞. Dashed lines indicate
the smallest and the largest initial conditions of non-faulty
agents.
7 Conclusions
We considered multi-agent systems interacting over a
directed network topology, where a subset of agents is
faulty and where the non-faulty agents have the goal of
achieving consensus and are subject to an additional dif-
ferential privacy requirement. Our main contribution is
the introduction an algorithm, the DP-MSR algorithm,
and the characterization of its correctness, accuracy and
differential privacy properties. Simulations were used to
illustrate the results. Future work will be aimed at ex-
tending the results presented in this paper to consider:
(i) the analysis of differential privacy in more general
scenarios, where the faulty agents do not respect the net-
work communication policy; (ii) asynchronous systems;
(iii) the design of algorithms to detect and isolate faulty
agents.
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